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Abstract. There are two perspectives from which formal theories can be viewed. On the one
hand, one can take a theory to be about some privileged models. On the other hand, one can take
all models of a theory to be on a par. In contrast with what is usually done in philosophical debates,
we adopt the latter viewpoint. Suppose that from this perspective we want to add an adequate truth
predicate to a background theory. Then on the one hand the truth theory ought to be semantically
conservative over the background theory. At the same time, it is generally recognised that the central
function of a truth predicate is an expressive one. A truth predicate ought to allow us to express
propositions that we could not express before. In this article we argue that there are indeed natural
truth theories which satisfy both the demand of semantical conservativeness and the demand of
adequately extending the expressive power of our language.
§1. Introduction. It is generally agreed that a truth predicate has an expressive func-
tion. A core function of a truth predicate is to increase our conceptual repertoire. A truth
predicate widens the class of thoughts that we can express.
According to the axiomatic tradition, the meaning of a truth predicate is spelled out at
least in part by postulating basic principles by which it is governed. In order to adequately
represent the expressive function of truth a minimally satisfactory theory of truth should not
be conceptually reducible to the background theory: it should not be possible to simulate
the truth predicate in the background theory.
Most existing axiomatic theories of truth postulating an irreducible truth predicate result
in a theory of truth that is non-conservative over its background theory. Indeed, it is often
thought that non-conservativeness can be a virtue of truth theories. It is taken to demon-
strate how a truth predicate can help us to zoom in on the intended interpretation of our
theory. This is then interpreted as a manifestation of the substantiality of truth, and used as
an argument against deflationism.
Yet conceptual irreducibility does not entail non-conservativeness. In certain contexts it
can even be reasonable to insist on a truth predicate that is both conceptually irreducible
and conservative. There are contexts where one is reluctant to privilege one model over
another, and where one does not want a theory of truth to exclude models for the original
language. In particular, this is the case in the single mathematical field where truth predi-
cates play a major role, viz. model theory, and in uses of model theory in proof theory.
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346 MARTIN FISCHER AND LEON HORSTEN
In this sense, our aim is similar to that of Tarski (1935) in his ‘Der Wahrheitsbegriff
in den formalisierten Sprachen’. Tarski did not aim to give a theory of truth for natural
language: he thought that this concept is incoherent. Instead, he was concerned with estab-
lishing beyond reasonable doubt that the uses of truth predicates in metamathematics are
legitimate. On the other hand, Tarski’s aims were of course not entirely the same as ours.
He wanted to give a definition of truth in formalised languages, and that is of course not
our objective.1
In this article, we will explore the role that a truth predicate as an irreducible but conser-
vative notion plays in model theory. For this purpose we will make use of a primitive truth
predicate in contrast to the usual set theoretic definition of truth in model theory, because an
axiomatic approach to truth allows for a minimal account of formalising a model theoretic
notion of truth. We propose that a truth theory that is conservative over the base theory but
non-interpretable in it, is sufficiently natural to capture key uses that are made of a truth
predicate in model theory.
There are additional reasons for being interested in the way in which a truth predicate
functions in the clean context of model theory. First, model theory is an area in which truth
predicates are used as intended. Second, as a mathematical discipline, model theory pro-
vides an environment in which several uses of truth can be compared objectively. Third, the
expressive powers of mathematical systems are measurable, thus allowing us to investigate
the notion of increase of expressive power.
This article is structured as follows.
First, the notion of expressiveness is investigated: an explication is given of what it
means for a formal language to be at least as expressive as another language. We will argue
that a question of expressive strength of a language should always be posed relative to a
theory formulated in the language. In our investigation, we will restrict our attention to
extensional aspects of meaning, and to the situation where one language is an expansion
of another language. Thus we fall short of giving a general account of expressiveness.
Nevertheless, our theory is sufficiently general to allow us to judge whether a concept of
truth adds genuine expressive strength to a language (relative to a theory).
Second, we describe an attractive axiomatic theory of truth that is semantically conser-
vative over its background theory, but is not relatively interpretable in it. Since it is not
interpretable in its background theory, it is not conceptually reducible to it. Therefore it is
a candidate for capturing the expressive power of truth.
Third, we show that this truth theory does capture the uses that are made of truth in
model theory and proof theory in a natural way. For this purpose, we discuss some of
the principal uses that are made of the notion of truth in model theory and proof theory.
First, we describe the connection between the notion of truth and problems concerning the
finite axiomatisability of theories. Second, we will explicate the role of truth in proofs of a
paradigmatic model-theoretic theorem: Gödel’s completeness theorem. Third, we discuss
the phenomenon of speed-up as a sign of the expressive power of truth. And fourth, we will
investigate the role of the concept of truth in proving reflection principles. It will emerge
that the formal theory of truth that we propose neatly covers all these cases.
§2. The expressive power of the truth predicate. One of the main themes of this
paper is the conviction that the expressive function of a truth predicate is central to an
1 Compare Hodges (2008).
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THE EXPRESSIVE POWER OF TRUTH 347
understanding of truth. This amounts to saying that the truth predicate allows us to express
things we cannot express otherwise. So in some sense the truth predicate has an irreducible
expressive function.2
The expressive function of the truth predicate is often illustrated by examples such as
the Law of Excluded Middle for a language L:
For all sentences φ of L, either φ is true or φ is not true.
As there are infinitely many instances of this law, we could not have expressed the same
proposition by asserting all of them one by one. Such ordinary uses of truth are ubiquitous
in mathematical logic. For instance, when a mathematical logician glosses her proposition
by saying
(IC) “Every PA independent 1-sentence is true”,
her use of the concept of truth is in our final analysis of the same kind as when she says
“Everything Judy said yesterday is true”. The truth predicate is indispensable in these
cases, and in this sense the truth predicate is irreducible.3
Our reasoning needs some explaining. Usually model theorists would take the notion of
truth for arithmetic to be the notion of truth in the standard model for arithmetic. This is
reasonable in a context with a strong background theory such as set theory. However there
are viable alternatives. In the example (IC) the complexity of the sentences is restricted so
that we could use a definable restricted truth predicate for a formalisation. In cases where
the complexity of the sentences is not restricted we have to make use of a primitive notion
of truth or a stronger background theory. If we want to address the question of a minimal
framework sufficient to formalize the claim (IC) then we opt for an axiomatic theory of
truth. And in this context the model theoretic claim (IC) can be understood in terms of
ordinary use of truth. In the end all the formalisations refer back to some intuitions a
truth predicate has to satisfy. We can judge whether a definition of truth is adequate only
by considering criteria of adequacy. However, sometimes those criteria can be directly
understood as axioms, and therefore we consider the axioms to be basic.
The expressive function of the truth predicate is widely recognised. Deflationist accounts
of truth even take the expressive role of truth to be central. Some deflationists go further
than this and claim that the expressive function is the sole function of the truth predicate.4
In this article we do not sign up to any such further constraints that some deflationists want
to impose on theories of truth. We wish to investigate what truth theories are minimally
committed to if we take as our single desideratum that they capture the expressive function
of the concept of truth.
Expressiveness is in need of explication in several ways. One question concerns the
objects to which we attribute expressiveness. Confining ourselves to formal settings, there
are at least three options: Languages, logics or theories.
2 An example of such a view is Quine (1970, chap. 1). Quine emphasised the irreducibility of the
notion of truth in cases where one wants to ascertain an infinite lot of sentences.
3 This is not to say that we could not introduce devices such as propositional quantification to
express these ‘infinitary’ statements. Usually such devices are connected with commitments that
we could avoid if we would have a truth predicate instead. With a truth predicate we can stay
within the confines of extensional first-order logic. We merely have to specify rules for the truth
predicate for it to be able to function as an expressive device.
4 See, for example, Horwich (1998).
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It is not clear whether there is a primary use, although it seems more natural to apply
the concept of expressiveness to languages and to logics. To attribute expressive power to
formal theories almost seems to be an abuse of language. Theories have deductive power,
which has to be separated from expressive power; only in a somewhat derivative sense is
it admissible to apply the notion of expressiveness to theories. Yet in the final analysis
expressiveness is connected to logics, languages, and theories, as they are intertwined in
a way that makes a strict separation impossible. The aim of this section is to try to make
sense of expressiveness for extensional first-order languages with respect to a certain class
of intended models.
Expressiveness is usually understood as a semantical notion. So if we consider logics or
languages, then we take them already to be equipped with a certain semantics. Model-
theoretic semantics captures some of the extensional aspects of meaning, and for our
modest purposes this is sufficient. So we consider formal languages equipped with a model-
theoretic semantics. In other words, we consider languages as coming with a class of
intended models. And as we have already announced, we will concentrate on mathematical
languages. Many such languages have a large class of intended interpretations—think
of the language of group theory, for instance. Other languages are often taken to have
(up to isomorphism, perhaps) only one intended interpretation: the language of arithmetic
is a case in point.
One indicator of expressive strength that appears to be especially suitable for languages
with a unique intended model is given by the definable class of subsets of the domain
of discourse of the intended interpretation. A language L is then said to be at least as
expressive as L′ if and only if in L we can define at least all the subsets of the domain
of the intended structure that are definable in L′. This strategy seems useful in the case of
arithmetic, and since we are working in a setting where we identify syntactical objects with
numbers, it seems also an attractive option in our situation.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons for not following this explication. First, this
strategy is not very generally applicable: it can be applied only if the two languages have
the same unique intended model. The intended model or standard model of arithmeticN is
often taken to be well understood and the definable subsets of ω are subject of deep logical
investigations. But this situation does not generally obtain.
Second, talk of the standard model of arithmetic is not without its problems. We cannot
fix the standard model by means of a first-order theory; in order to give a categorical theory
of the standard model, we have to introduce stronger means such as standard second-order
semantics. For our purposes we would prefer a criterion that avoids commitments such as
those introduced by standard second order logic. If we already had a notion of standard
model then we could also make use of the notion of truth in the standard model, which
would not allow for an analysis of how much proof-theoretic strength we need to be able
to capture relevant uses of the model theoretic notion of truth. We will argue that there is
an alternative criterion, which is attractive and avoids those commitments.5
In the general model theory, all models are usually taken as being on a par: no single
model is more ‘intended’ than another. This attitude is appropriate for so-called ‘algebraic’
5 Doubts about the usefulness of the talk of the standard model of arithmetic have also been
expressed by metamathematicians such as Bovykin. Bovykin’s idea of arithmetical splitting,
i.e. absolute unprovable arithmetical statements, stands in sharp contrast to the conception of
the standard model.
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mathematical theories.6 From that perspective, the definition of expressiveness takes
another form: one looks at classes of models characterisable by sentences of the language.
This is in line with the conception that the meaning of a sentence is the class of models
satisfying the sentence, rather than one intended interpretation. The general idea behind
the explication is this: a language L′ is at least as expressive as a language L if and only
if for every sentence ϕ in L there is a sentence ψ in L′, such that ψ characterizes a class
of models which is equivalent, in the relevant sense, to the class of models characterized
by ϕ.
Recall that for a logic L and a signature τ :
DEFINITION 2.1. A class of τ -structures κ is an elementary class in L, in symbols κ ∈
ECL, iff there is a ϕ ∈ L[τ ] such that κ = MODτL(ϕ), where MODτL(ϕ) is the class of
L-models of ϕ.7
In the field of model-theoretic logics an explication of expressive power of logics based
on elementary classes has been fruitful.8 Let L1, L2 be two (abstract model-theoretic)
logics, i.e., a specification of the syntax and a model-theoretic semantics. L2 is at least
as expressive as L1 if and only if every elementary class in L1 is elementary in L2. This
explication is adequate to order logics with respect to their expressive power. It has, for
example, the consequence that second-order logic is at least as expressive as first-order
logic. It is also used in Lindström’s characterisation of first-order logics as the strongest
logic that has the properties of compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem.9
Whereas the comparison of different logics is very interesting on its own, we want
to focus on theories of truth formulated as first-order theories.10 There are at least three
problems with transferring the model-theoretic criterion for expressiveness of logics to
first-order languages. Firstly, we are now talking about specific languages with fixed sig-
natures and we need a way to compare them. Secondly, languages considered only as
given by their signature and inductive definition of well-formed formula without a class of
intended interpretations or a theory would trivialise the criterion. Third, we do not want
an explanation that reduces to a comparison of deductive power of theories formulated in
these languages.
In order to answer the first problem we consider a simplified case where one language is
a subset of the other language. In this case it is obvious that the second language is at least
as strong as the first. Moreover in order to be able to classify languages as properly stronger
6 For the distinction between algebraic mathematical theories (such as group theory) and non-
algebraic mathematical theories (such as real analysis), see Shapiro (1997, pp. 40–41).
7 Sometimes two notions of elementary classes are distinguished. In addition to the given definition
we have that a class of τ -structures κ is elementary in L in the wider sense if there is a set of
sentences 	 in L[τ ], such that κ = MODτL (	).
8 Barwise & Feferman (1985).
9 Barwise & Feferman (1985).
10 There are multiple reasons for this. First, there is the pragmatic reason that the best investigated
axiomatic truth theories are first-order theories. Second, first-order logic seems sufficient for many
purposes. For example set theory is a tool available that allows to formalise most of mathematics
and seems therefore sufficient for most purposes. Third, a background logic that is too strong
would conceal the differences of the axiomatic theories of truth we want to analyse. For our
minimalist aims it seems therefore natural to stick to first-order logic. This is not supposed to be
a convincing argument for a first-order thesis that argues for first-order logic as the only viable
logic, but rather a justification of our focus. For an argument against second-order logic as the
underlying logic the reader may consult Väänänen (2001).
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than others it is sufficient to look at model expansions and model reducts to compare classes
of models with two different signatures. For a more general explication we would need
a way to compare languages with different signatures, which could be accomplished by
structure preserving translations and a corresponding function on the classes of models.11
These translations would allow us to abstract away from any specific signature and talk
about classes of languages.
This solves our first problem of comparing models of different signatures. But if we do
not restrict the possible interpretations, then a problem of trivialisation arises.12 So far we
did not consider a restriction of the interpretation of the vocabulary under consideration.
However we want to compare the expressive power of a language without a truth predicate
with a language containing a truth predicate and therefore we have to restrict the class
of models in an appropriate way. This observation alone shows that a strict separation
between languages and theories is not adequate for an explication of expressiveness. To
avoid this trivialization, we will focus on expressiveness of a language with respect to a
fixed context, where we think of a class of (intended) structures as fixing the context. So we
think of a languageL and the class of allL-models, MODL, restricted to a class of intended
models IML, where IML ⊆ MODL. In the interest of readability we have simplified the
expression by dropping the subscript for the logic, as we only consider first-order logic.
Moreover we replaced the superscript τ for the signature by L in order to directly refer to
the language.
In most cases we will think of an axiomatisable theory as fixing the context. Usually
we are in the context of a specific subject, such as arithmetic for example. We consider the
languageLA with signature τA = {0, 1, S, +, ·}. Furthermore we think of the interpretation
of the vocabulary as fixed to some extent. We take as a minimal criterion for a language to
be an arithmetical language that the axioms of Robinson Arithmetic (Q) are satisfied. For
a language of truth based on an arithmetical language we require it to satisfy at least the
Tarski-biconditionals for arithmetical sentences in addition to Q.
If we relativize the languages L1 and L2 to the classes of intended models given by the
theories T1 and T2, respectively, we have to make sure that we can recover every model
of T1 as a reduct of a model of T2. For this we will appeal to the notion of a semantically
conservative extension,13 which is based on the concept of model expansion:14
DEFINITION 2.2. A theory T2 is a semantically conservative extension of T1 if and only if
every model of T1 can be expanded to a model of T2.
If the classes of intended structures are given by theories we will say that:
DEFINITION 2.3. Let L1 ⊆ L2. Then L2 is expressively stronger with respect to T2 than L1
with respect to T1 (in symbols: L1(T1) < L2(T2) ) iff there is a class of models κ which is
11 The translation should probably satisfy more criteria, such as preserving the vocabulary that is
part of both signatures. In terms of category theory, the corresponding function on models is a
contravariant functor: see Visser (2004).
12 For example if we state the criterion as follows: Let L1 ⊆ L2. L2 is expressively stronger than
L1 if and only if there is an elementary class κ of L2 such that κ ′ = {ML1 |M ∈ κ} is not
elementary in L1. Of course this definition is only useful if L2 is an extension of L1. But that is
the only situation that interests us in this article, where L2 is obtained by adding a truth predicate
to L1.
13 The distinction between syntactical and semantical conservativeness is implicit in Craig & Vaught
(1958, p. 292).
14 An expansion of a modelM adds interpretations for new vocabulary but the domain is preserved.
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elementary in L2 with respect to T2, but for which the class κ ′ of reducts is not elementary
in L1 with respect to T1.15
Due to the restriction to language expansions and semantically conservative extensions,
this explication of expressive force indeed only has a limited scope. But it does cover all
the cases that are of interest to us in this article. For instance, this explication entails that
the language of class theory with respect to the class theoretic version of Kripke-Platek
set theory is expressively stronger than the language of set theory with respect to KP, and
the language of second-order arithmetic with respect to RCA0 is expressively stronger
than the language of first-order arithmetic with respect to I
1. In this article, we are only
interested in certain specific cases of relative expressive power. We want to discuss the
specific expressive function that a truth predicate can and does play as part of an axiomatic
theory of truth. We will make use of our explication in Section 5 to show that the language
of arithmetic expanded by a truth predicate is expressively stronger than the language of
arithmetic itself. There are facts about the natural numbers that we cannot express in the
languageLA, no matter which theory we relativise this language to: for example, there is no
sentence of arithmetic that will restrict the class of models to the singleton of the standard
model, {N} (or its isomorphism type). But there is no first-order language expansion that is
expressive enough to express this. Up to isomorphism, {N} is an EC in standard second-
order logic but not in first-order. But also the class of PA-models is not elementary in LA,
for there is no single sentence that has this class as its models. We will show that in this
case we can expand the language by a truth predicate in such a way that the class of PA-
models becomes elementary. But before doing this we want to motivate our restriction to
conservative extensions.
§3. Conservativeness. Some philosophers have suggested that an adequate deflation-
ist theory of truth should be conservative over the background theory.16 They have claimed
that this requirement follows from the fact that truth is insubstantial.17 But all deflationists
hold that truth has an expressive function. So one may wonder whether the demands of
expressiveness and conservativeness are compatible, given our preferred explication of
expressiveness of truth notions. After all, we take expressiveness to be intimately connected
to deductive strength.
The previous section shows that there are at least two notions of conservativeness rele-
vant to our discussion. Let S and T be theories, i.e. deductively closed sets of formulas:
1. The common proof-theoretic notion of T being a (syntactically) conservative exten-
sion of S if and only if S ⊆ T and for all ϕ in the language of S, if T proves ϕ, then
already S proves ϕ;
2. The model-theoretic notion of T being a (semantically) conservative extension of S
if and only if all the models of S can be expanded to models of T .
These two notions are not equivalent. The semantical notion is stronger in the sense that
every semantically conservative extension is also a syntactically conservative extension.
15 A more general and formal explication is given in Section 11.
16 See Horsten (1995), Ketland (1999), and Shapiro (1998).
17 For example Ketland says: ‘if truth is non-substantial—as deflationists claim—then the theory of
truth should be conservative’ (Ketland, 1999, p. 79). However this inference has been challenged,
for example by Halbach (2014) and Horsten (2011, chap. 7).
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The converse is not generally the case as is shown by the theory CT: the Tarskian com-
positional theory of truth with induction restricted to the truth-free background language
of arithmetic.18 CT is a syntactically conservative extension of PA but CT is not se-
mantically conservative, because only recursively saturated non-standard models can be
expanded to models of CT.19
In the literature on deflationism it is not always made explicit which notion of con-
servativeness is considered. The distinction between the two notions of conservativeness
depends on what one takes a theory to be. If one accepts the picture of theories determining
the range of interpretations as a class of models, as is generally done in the so-called
semantic view of scientific theories,20 then the semantical conservativeness is a better
motivated explication of non-substantiality.21
Shapiro motivates the deflationist claim of conservative truth with the example of Karl,
which suggests a reading of the conservativeness claim involving the notion of semantical
conservativeness.22 A semantically non-conservative theory of truth is a theory of truth
that rules out some of the models of the background theory. A semantically conservative
notion of truth, on the other hand, leaves all the possible interpretations of the background
theory intact.
If we take the perspective of one intended interpretation of arithmetic, and the concomi-
tant definition of expressiveness in terms of definable subsets, then of course no possibil-
ities are eliminated by non-conservative truth theories. All models save the intended one
are not what the theory is really about. So if some of them are eliminated by the truth
theory: no matter! But if we take the general model theoretic (or algebraic) perspective and
treat all models as being on a par, then a truth theory for a background theory should not
eliminate possibilities, for then it would not be a truth theory for the background theory
(conceived of as a class of models). The general model theoretic perspective is the one
that is adopted in mathematical logic, especially in model theory and in the proof-theoretic
analysis of theorems of model theory. Hence the preference in those areas for truth theories
that are semantically conservative. In this article, we discuss truth theories from this model-
theoretic or algebraic perspective.
All this does not entail, of course, that non-conservative truth theories are mistaken or
devoid of interest. It just means that from the general model theoretic perspective that
we are adopting, they are not appropriate. They are appropriate only from the perspective
where one does not consider any model of a given background theory as being as good as
any other.
§4. A minimally adequate theory of truth. In this section we present the truth theory
PT−. This theory was first formulated and investigated in Fischer (2009). We will argue that
it satisfies the expressive uses of truth in the minimal (conservative) way that is required
from the algebraic perspective that we are adopting in this article.
The theory PT− is based on a theory of syntax, which we will take to be PA. This is not
uncommon, and there is rhyme and reason to it. On the one hand we know that sequential
18 For a precise definition of CT see Halbach (2014).
19 This follows by a theorem of Lachlan: see Kaye (1991, p. 228).
20 See for example Suppe (1977).
21 Thanks to Volker Halbach for pointing this out to us.
22 See Shapiro (1998), 487f.
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arithmetical theories allow for an arithmetisation of parts of metamathematics including
theories of syntax. On the other hand PA is a very natural theory of arithmetic, especially
in the context of theories of truth.
Since we are working in a theory extending PA, we have all the formulas available
that represent the primitive recursive syntactical relations for the language of arithmetic,
especially:
(x, y) = z; Seq(x); lh(x) = y; Ct (x); Snt (x), Fml1(x).
defining ordered pairs, sequences, the length of a sequence, closed terms, sentences and
formulas with one free variable of the (truth-free) arithmetical language, respectively.
We will use the metavariables s, t for closed terms, i.e. we will use ∀tψ(t) as an abbre-
viation for ∀x(Ct (x) → ψ(x)). We use n to denote the numeral S...S0, i.e. n successor
symbols concatenated with the symbol for zero.
Furthermore we consider the language to contain function symbols for some specific
primitive recursive functions. For some cases we use the dot notation . such as =. ; ¬. ; ∧. ;
∨. ; ∀. ; ∃. ; ucl. for the representation of the functions that applied to the Gödel numbers
of two terms s, t gives the Gödel number of the formula s = t , the negation, conjunction,
disjunction, universal and existential quantification function and the function that takes the
Gödel number of a formula to the Gödel number of its universal closure. We use the dot
notation ẋ for the representation of the num-function that takes a number to the Gödel
number of its numeral. val represents the value function that applied to a closed term gives
the value. Moreover we have a three place substitution function x(t/s) that applied to a
formula x a term t and a variable s gives the Gödel number of the formula resulting from
substituting all free occurrences of s in x by t . In the case where x is a formula with one
free variable, then x(t) is short for the result of substituting the term t in x for all free
occurrences of the free variable.23
The language LT is the language of arithmetic LA expanded by a one place predicate T .
We intend T to be a truth predicate for the language LA.24 The axioms of PT− are given
by the axioms of PA and the following axioms:
(C1) ∀s∀t (T (s =. t) ↔ val(s) = val(t))
(C2) ∀s∀t (T ( ¬. (s =. t)) ↔ ¬val(s) = val(t))
(C3) ∀x∀y(Snt (x ∧. y) → (T (x ∧. y) ↔ T (x) ∧ T (y)))
(C4) ∀x∀y(Snt ( ¬. (x ∧. y)) → (T ( ¬. (x ∧. y)) ↔ T ( ¬. x) ∨ T ( ¬. y)))
(C5) ∀x(Snt ( ∀. y x) → (T ( ∀. y x) ↔ ∀zT (x(ż))))
(C6) ∀x(Snt ( ¬. ∀. y x) → (T ( ¬. ∀. y x) ↔ ∃zT ( ¬. x(ż))))
(C7) ∀x(Snt ( ¬. ¬. x) → (T ( ¬. ¬. x) ↔ T (x)))
(C8) ∀x(T (x) → Snt (x))
(C9) ∀s∀t∀x(val(s) = val(t) → (T (x(s)) ↔ T (x(t))))
tot (x) :⇔ Fml1(x) ∧ ∀y(T (x(ẏ)) ∨ T ( ¬. x(ẏ))).
23 For precise definitions of these notions see Halbach (2014).
24 This restriction is only for simplification and we could also extend the theory by giving axioms
for languages containing LA.
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The induction axiom is then a form of internal induction restricted to total formulas:
(ItI) ∀x(tot (x) ∧ T (x(0)) ∧ ∀y(T (x(ẏ)) → T (x(y +. 1))) → ∀yT (x(ẏ)))
PT− := PA ∪ (C1) − (C9) ∪ (ItI)
The theory PT− is adequate in Tarski’s sense, i.e. all Tarski-biconditionals for LA are
provable. Moreover, all universal Tarski-biconditionals (sentences of the form ∀x(φ(x) ↔
T (φ(ẋ)), where φ does not contain T ) are also provable.
PT− is a compositional theory of truth. But in contrast to Tarskian theories of truth there
is no axiom for the commutation of negation and truth. This commutation axiom is also
called the ‘completeness and consistency’ axiom and is here abbreviated as (CC):
(CC) ∀x(Snt (x) → (¬T (x) ↔ T ( ¬. x))).
The absence of (CC) means that PT− is a positive theory of truth. The constructive
part of the axioms is stated in a form such that the axioms can be rewritten as a positive
inductive definition. Semantically, this gives rise to a monotone operator and a fixed point
that defines the inductive set of true (in the standard model) arithmetical sentences.25
In contrast to its base theory, PT− is finitely axiomatisable. For this it suffices to realise
that I
1 ∪ (C1) − (C9) ∪ (ItI) proves all the instances of arithmetical induction. As I
1
is finitely axiomatisable, so is PT−. The finite axiomatisability of PT− is connected to
the formulation of induction as an axiom instead of as a scheme. Induction formulated
as an axiom is very natural: the disposition to accept all instances of a scheme seems to
be rooted in the belief in a single principle. The induction axiom of PT− is basically an
induction principle for atomic formulas of the form T (x). The point is that with our theory
of syntax we can code sentences ϕ of arbitrary complexity. This complexity does not show
up directly in the code ϕ so that T (ϕ) is still atomic. It is therefore natural that we get
full arithmetical induction back even if we start only with induction for 
1-formulas. This
also shows that, for any n, a restriction of induction to 
n-formulas is artificial as we will
get full arithmetical induction by adding truth to it. So the choice of PA as base theory is
justified and not arbitrary.
Replacing the induction schema by an induction axiom seems justified and there is a
story to be told here which we will consider in the next section. But the induction axiom of
PT− is unusual: it is restricted to total formulas. At first sight this restriction might seem
unjustified. In the following we will give three possible justifications.
Totality in itself seems to be a natural restriction at least in the context of type-free
theories where we have cases of sentences that are neither true nor their negation is true.
So Cantini and Feferman make use of such restrictions in their theories KFt and DT.26
The problem is that in the case of typed theories we seem to lack this motivation, since for
all formulas φ(x) in the language of arithmetic and for all natural numbers n, φ(n) will be
true in the standard model or its negation will be.
Nonetheless, this argument is not conclusive. An argument for the restriction of the
induction principle goes as follows. We are considering a restriction of internal induction.
In this case we have a formula Fml1(x) representing the set of arithmetical formulas
with one free variable. By overspill we know that there are nonstandard models with
25 The set of arithmetical truths is hyperelementary, because there is also a positive inductive
definition that characterises the complement. See, for example, McGee (1991).
26 In the setting of those type-free systems, adding (CC) leads to an outright inconsistency.
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nonstandard elements satisfying this formula. Moreover it is possible to show that there
are models M of the positive inductive definition of truth with an element c such that
M | Fml1(x) ∧ ¬tot (x)[c]. If we now understand {b ∈ M |M | T (x(y))[c, b]} as
the extension and {b ∈ M |M | T ( ¬. x(y))[c, b]} as the anti-extension of a nonstandard
formula c in M, then this formula is flawed, i.e. there are b such that b is neither in the
extension nor the anti-extension. The restriction of internal induction to total formulas is
therefore a motivated restriction in the sense that it allows for induction only on formulas
that are also well-behaved on the nonstandard part.
Thus, ultimately the situation is as follows. We do not want to accept instantiations of
induction for non-standard elements that are not truth-determinate for the property in ques-
tion for exactly the same reason that we resist inductive premises for soritical predicates.
Note that the reply that in the “intended” model there are no such non-standard elements
to be found is not undermining our motivation for restriction; as we have emphasised
repeatedly, we are adopting the model-theoretic viewpoint, and from this viewpoint, all
models are on a par.
A comparison with subsystems of second-order-arithmetic clarifies our point. In the case
of the second-order theory of arithmetic ACA we have induction for subsets we do not
have comprehension for: this reveals an unnatural asymmetry. This asymmetry is avoided
in the case of the second-order arithmetical theory ACA0.27 So it is with PT−. We only
have induction for formulas that behave appropriately with respect to the truth predicate.
The second-order theory ACA0 is a sub-theory of a definitional extension of PT−, and PT−
is a sub-theory of a definitional extension of ACA0.28 This is a much stronger connection
than mutual relative interpretability. For example, the arithmetic vocabulary is not changed
in the translation: the translation function induces a model transformation that preserves
the interpretation of the arithmetical part.
PT− is a semantically conservative extension of PA.29 This fact is established indirectly
as follows: Take a modelM of PA. As ACA0 is a semantically conservative extension of
PA we get a modelM∗ of ACA0.30 By the fact that PT− is a subtheory of a definitional
extension of ACA0 we have a transformation of ACA0-models to PT−-models in such a
way that the arithmetical structure is preserved. So we obtain a modelM′ of PT− andM′
is an expansion ofM.
In a specific sense, PT− is closely connected to its base theory: it does not restrict the
possible interpretations and is therefore not substantial and in one sense only a minimal
expansion of PA. In another respect it is not very close to PA, namely it is not relatively
interpretable in PA. This is readily established by the finite axiomatizability of PT− and
Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. The fact that PT− is not relatively interpretable in
PA shows that PT− is not conceptually reducible to it.31 We explore the relation between
this conceptual irreducibility and the gain in expressive power. The restriction of induction
to total formulas is thus exactly what is needed to maintain the balance between semantical
27 See Simpson (1999).
28 For a proof of those two facts see Fischer (2009).
29 Cantini (1989) proves that the type-free theory KFt containing PT− is a syntactically conservative
extension of PA. Although in one version of the conservativity proof he uses model-theoretic
methods it does not directly imply the semantical conservativeness of PT−.
30 See Simpson (1999).
31 For the connection between conceptual reducibility and relative interpretability, see Niebergall
(2000).
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conservativeness and non-interpretability in PA. So from a standpoint of metamathematical
pragmatism, one can take the truth theoretic part as being purely instrumental over the
arithmetical part. If one is prepared to take this standpoint, then the principles of the ideal
part require no further motivation: success suffices.
PT− is a typed theory of truth: it does not tell us anything about the truth of sentences
that themselves contain the truth predicate. For explicating the implicit and explicit uses
of the concept of truth in mathematical contexts, this is fine: in mathematics (in contrast
to philosophy) there appear to be no uses of reflexive truth. Nonetheless, it is possible to
extend PT− to a natural type-free theory that captures the function of truth in mathematics
equally well. The theory in question is called KFt , which was first proposed and investi-
gated by Cantini.32 However, we will show in the following sections that the theory PT−
already fulfils the tasks that, from a general model theoretic perspective, one may expect a
truth theory to be equal to. So for our purposes there seems no incentive to consider type-
free variants of PT− in further detail. Moreover, as far as the authors know, it is an open
question whether KFt is semantically conservative over PA.
§5. Finite axiomatisability. Kreisel held the view that our evidence for the truth of the
first-order axiom scheme of mathematical induction resides in the second-order axiom of
mathematical induction: we accept the first-order scheme because we believe the second-
order axiom (as a single proposition).33 But this has been disputed. We may not have a
good grasp of the concept of being an arbitrary subset of an infinite set: this concept might
be to some extent inherently indeterminate.
Nevertheless, Kreisel’s theory brings a question about the relation between dispositions
and beliefs to the fore, which is in the end a question about finitisation. An alternative to
Kreisel’s view would be the following. Our acceptance of the induction scheme for first-
order arithmetical formulas is indeed backed up by a belief in a single proposition. But this
proposition is merely what is expressed by the statement that all first-order arithmetical
instances of the scheme are true.
A typical example of the expressive power of the truth predicate is given in examples
such as ‘All axioms of ZFC are true’. We can express in one sentence a statement that is not
expressible (in a certain sense) in the language of set theory, which is usually considered
to be very expressive.34 ZFC itself is not finitely axiomatisable in the language of set
theory and there is no finitely axiomatisable theory containing ZFC in the language of set
theory. But with the truth predicate T and a definable predicate AxZFC we can state a single
sentence ∀x(Snt (x)∧AxZFC(x) → T (x)), which is a fairly good approximation. To justify
that it adequately approximates what we want, we need a theory capable of coding syntax
and a theory of truth that satisfies convention T, such that all the uniform T-biconditionals
are derivable. Furthermore the two theories should be finitely axiomatisable.
This is the problem about finite axiomatisability that Craig & Vaught (1958) sought
to solve.35 For any axiomatisable theory S with only infinite models, there is a finitely
32 See Cantini (1989).
33 See Kreisel (1967, p. 148).
34 The sense in which it is not expressible in ZFC is the following: There is no sentence in the
language of set theory having all axioms of ZFC as consequences, where the set of consequences
is consistent.
35 Their solution was based on a result by Kleene, and they actually proved a slightly more general
theorem about finite axiomatisability than the one that we are discussing here.
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axiomatisable theory S′ in a language expansion, such that S′ is a semantically conservative
extension of S. The point is that the expansion is basically an expansion by syntactical
predicates for LS (the first-order language of set theory) and a predicate T , which is a
truth predicate. The new axioms are the axioms of Q plus the compositional clauses for
truth, which is sufficient to prove the universal T-sentences for LS , plus the statement
∀x(SntLS (x) ∧ AxS(x) → T (x)). It is easily seen by the universal T-sentences that S′
contains S and that it is finitely axiomatised. For the conservativeness proof Craig/Vaught
use a model expansion argument.36
So the theorem given by Craig and Vaught is a very nice way to exemplify the expressive
power of the truth predicate. Two questions arise: Are all theories of truth adequate for this
purpose? What happens if the object theory is already capable of coding its own syntax?
Let us take the questions in turn. Concerning the first question, we have seen that for
the purpose of a finite axiomatisation it is sufficient to have a finitely axiomatised theory of
truth proving all the uniform T-sentences. This excludes theories of truth that have infinitely
many truth axioms such as the disquotational theories TB and UTB. TB is the theory of
truth extending PA by all the T-sentences for the language of arithmetic and UTB by all the
uniform T-sentences. Both theories have full induction for the languageLT .37 In the case of
compositional theories we have to make sure that the base theory is finitely axiomatisable.
CT, i.e. the Tarskian compositional theory of truth with restricted induction, for example
is not finitely axiomatisable, because PA is not. But the theory that Craig and Vaught use,
which is T (Q),38 is finitely axiomatised. So in the case of Tarski’s theory of truth, the
finite axiomatisability depends on the choice of the base theory. This seems to exclude PA
as a base theory for this purpose, although PA seems to be a very natural choice.
Concerning the second question, if we consider the exclusion of PA, then the remaining
choices seem rather inadequate for the general case. For consider PA as object theory. Then
PA itself is already capable of talking about its own syntax. So it is a viable option to take
the object theory itself as base theory for the truth theory. But in this case an extension of PA
by the axioms suggested by Craig/Vaught results in CT, which is not finitely axiomatisable
and therefore cannot fulfil the expected purpose. The main reason is the infinite axiom
schema of induction in PA. For a finite axiomatisation we would have to replace it by an
axiom of induction as for example in systems of second-order arithmetic. But also the truth
predicate allows the formulation of induction axioms.
So what we want for a non-finitely axiomatisable theory S containing Q, is a language
expansion LS′ and a finitely axiomatisable theory S′, such that S′ is a (semantically)
conservative extension of S, and S′ makes use of the resources already given by Q. Specific
examples of this phenomenon are PA and ACA0 as well as ZFC and NBG. Note that if S
is (essentially) reflexive, as is the case with PA and ZFC, then S does not interpret S′
by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. In both cases we find a conservative finite
axiomatisation by increase of expressiveness. In both cases this expanded expressive-
ness seems to be gained by allowing second order variables. But what the second-order
36 The compositional axioms are basically the axioms of CT which correspond to the claim of the
existence of a satisfaction class. Whereas CT is not semantically conservative over PA because of
Lachlan’s theorem, Craig and Vaught’s model expansion argument is compatible with Lachlan’s
result. The reason for this is that they introduce a new arithmetic theory and add therefore new
syntactical vocabulary.
37 For a precise definition see Halbach (2014).
38 T (Q) consists of Robinson Arithmetic (Q) plus the axioms that state that the truth predicate
commutes with the logical connectives.
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variables actually do is allowing a definition of a truth predicate which increases the
expressive power. So this phenomenon is better understood as the possibility of defining
a truth predicate. In both cases we can define a truth predicate for which the uniform
T-biconditionals hold for the T-free instances. Moreover they satisfy some compositional
clauses except for the commutation of truth with the negation sign.39 So what we are
looking for is a positive truth predicate.
We shall show that the truth theory PT− is exactly of the desired form. PT− is a finitely
axiomatisable and a (semantically) conservative extension of PA, containing all universal
Tarski-biconditionals. By applying these facts to our explication of expressivity we see that
the truth predicate increases the expressive power. As classes of intended interpretations
we consider for the language of arithmetic the class of Q models and for the language
of truth the class of TB(Q) models, where TB(Q) is the disquotation theory of Tarski-
biconditionals over the base theory Q.
The finite axiomatisation of PT− shows that the class of PT− models is elementary with
respect to TB(Q), i.e. κ = {(M, S) | (M, S) | PT−} is EC in LT with respect to TB(Q).
(M, S) is an expansion of the arithmetical modelM by a set S interpreting the predicate
T . The set κ ′ = {(M, S)LA | (M, S) ∈ κ} is by the semantical conservativity of PT− over
PA nothing but {M |M | PA}, which is not elementary in LA with respect to Q, since PA
is not finitely axiomatisable. This argument establishes then the following observation.
PROPOSITION 5.1. The language of truth (with respect to TB(Q)) is expressively stron-
ger than the language of arithmetic (with respect to Q), i.e.
LA(Q) < LT (TB(Q)).
A comment on the role of TB is in order to guard against misunderstandings of this
proposition. At first glance the axioms of TB might appear to be superfluous and the
proposition could be trivialized by the fact that we can establish a similar proposition for
LT with respect to Q formulated in LT . But in fact only the restriction via TB axioms
gives the proposition the specific content we want, namely that it is a truth predicate
which increases the expressive power. Without any specific axioms characterizing the new
predicate T it only says that there is some predicate that allows for more expressive power.
The truth predicate is so to say a witness for this phenomenon.
Similarly it is the role that PT− plays in the proof that highlights its merits, namely as a
witness for a finitely axiomatizable theory conservatively extending PA. Other conservative
theories of truth like UTB and CT are not able to capture this aspect of the expressive
function of truth as they are neither finitely axiomatisable nor semantically conservative.
There are other contexts in which something similar might prove useful. If we compare
our case with the case of set theory one could argue that our justification for accepting
the schema of replacement lies in the acceptance of a second-order axiom. So from a
Kreiselian perspective it is the acceptance of a finitely axiomatised theory like NBG that
justifies us in our acceptance of ZFC. But in the case of NBG this would entail an on-
tological commitment to proper classes. To avoid this ontological commitment one could
try to replace the class theory by a theory of satisfaction that is a finitely axiomatisable
conservative extension of ZFC. How this is done is shown by Fujimoto (2012, chap. 6.2.),
where he shows that the natural counterpart to Cantini’s KFt for ZFC, which Fujimoto
calls KFtc, has similar properties. Especially the conservativity and finite axiomatisability
39 For a summary, see Schindler (1994).
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can be established. It is easy to see that the natural typed counterpart for ZFC of the typed
theory PT− for ZFC has the same properties.
§6. Proving semantical metatheorems. In this section we show how to make use
of the expressive function of the truth predicate as captured by PT− to prove important
semantical metatheorems. This desideratum is already given in Ketland (1999), and it is
one of the key tasks that we expect a truth theory to be able to carry out. We focus on
Gödel’s completeness theorem. For a given logical calculus, the completeness is usually
stated as saying that: If 
 | ϕ, then 
  ϕ, or, equivalently, every consistent set of
sentences 
 has a model (making all the sentences in 
 true).40
Nowadays a very common way to proof completeness follows Henkin’s proof by build-
ing term models. Usually the textbook proofs are done informally, but it is tacitly assumed
that they can be formalised as proofs in ZFC. Furthermore it is well known that ZFC is
much stronger than is necessary for this task: already subsystems of second-order arith-
metic are sufficient to carry out the proof.41 But already in first-order arithmetical systems
weaker versions of the completeness proof can be carried out.
So let us review the completeness proof using Henkin models. Take a set of L-sentences

 that is consistent. 
 can be extended to a maximally consistent set of sentences 
′
in a language expansion L′ of L by a set of new constants. Furthermore the maximally
consistent set 
′ can be so construed as to contain witnesses for all existence claims.
This allows one to build a model M, where the domain is the set of terms of L′ and a
sentence is true in M iff it is in 
′. So we have constructed a Henkin model satisfying

. This proof is formalisable in set theory. We divide the completeness proof into three
steps: Step 1. Constructing a conservative Henkin expansion; Step 2. Every consistent
set can be extended to a maximally consistent set; Step 3. Every Henkin set has a term
model.
In the following we will sketch a proof following a formalisation in second order arith-
metic: for a more detailed proof see Section 12. First of all we will use the notion of truth to
recover the relevant second order notions. For this we will translate the language of second-
order arithmetic into the language LT . It is then possible to show that we can recover
arithmetical comprehension in PT− as a form of open truth comprehension. This form
of comprehension is sufficient to proof a translation of König’s lemma in PT−. König’s
lemma is relevant because a variant of the completeness proof that makes use of trees is
more fitting for a formalisation in theories weaker than set theory, such as subsystems of
second-order arithmetic.
The notions recovered by the translation are sufficient to carry out the first step of the
completeness proof in PT−. However the crucial step in the completeness proof is the
second step which is handled by an application of Lindenbaum’s lemma. The basic idea
in the formalisation is to reduce the question to trees, because then Lindenbaum’s lemma
can be reconstructed via König’s lemma.
In our version we can define the notion of a truth set, which is basically a consistent set
closed under the positive clauses of truth. It is a full truth set if it also contains all the true
40 Since Gödel first proved the completeness of first-order logic in his dissertation in 1929, there
have been further conceptual developments in this area. One of them is Tarski’s definition of a
model and the notion of truth in a model.
41 Simpson (1999, chap. IV.3) shows that WKL0, a system based on weak König’s lemma, is
sufficient.
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literals. We can then prove that every consistent set can be expanded to a full truth set. This
is established as follows: For every set of sentences 
 we can construct a tree T
 in such
a way that T
 is infinite iff 
 is consistent. Moreover the tree is such that an infinite path
through the tree will be a full truth set containing 
. Now if 
 is consistent, then T
 will
be infinite. By König’s lemma we can find an infinite path through that tree which will be
a full truth set.
These full truth sets are of such a form that they can be easily transformed into models,
which establishes the third step. This concludes the completeness proof in PT− and shows
that the truth predicate functions here in a natural way in the proof of a generalized version.
This is an example of the expressive function captured by PT−.
Let us now compare our formalisation in our preferred theory of truth to other versions.
Already in axiomatic first-order arithmetics we can prove restricted versions of the com-
pleteness theorem. Because of the limited expressive power, we can prove completeness
only for definable sets of sentences. In PA it is possible to prove a completeness theorem
for arithmetically definable theories.42 A version of the arithmetized completeness theorem
can already be proved in I
1 for recursively axiomatised theories.43 These first-order
arithmetics are expressively not sufficient to prove the generalised versions of the theorem;
we can only prove a schematic form. More promising as adequate formalisations are
versions in second order arithmetic.
Already RCA0 is sufficient for the definition of the necessary concepts and to prove some
of the relevant properties. In RCA0 we can define the completion of a set of sentences
by witnesses for existential statements to execute the first step and the third step in the
completeness proof. But we can only prove the existence of a completion of 
 for a
consistent and deductively closed 
. This gives us only a weak version of the completeness
theorem in RCA0: it gives us a completeness theorem only for deductively closed sets
of sentences.44 Recursive comprehension is not enough for the general case as there are
recursive sets of sentences that do not have a recursive completion, such as Q. For the
proof of the existence of a maximal consistent set with the right properties, weak König’s
lemma is both sufficient and necessary.
Weak König’s lemma allows us get from an infinite binary tree T
 to an infinite path in
T
 . This infinite path gives rise to a model satisfying 
. So in WKL0 we have a gener-
alised version of the completeness theorem for arithmetically definable sets of sentences.45
WKL0 is a fairly weak system of second-order arithmetic. The first-order part of WKL0 is
the same as the first-order part of RCA0, namely I
1. Furthermore, WKL0 is interpretable
in PA.46 So PA can simulate this completeness proof.
In the usual proof for countable languages an explicit construction of a maximally
consistent set is given, although the existence of such a set is sufficient. This difference
becomes important when formalising the completeness proof.
Trivially we can prove the same completeness theorem in stronger systems of second-
order arithmetic, especially in ACA0. But there is an advantage of the proof in ACA0.
ACA0 is equivalent to (full) König’s lemma over RCA0. Whereas with weak König’s
42 Kaye (1991, p. 186).
43 (Hájek & Pudlák, 1993, p. 104). It is interesting to notice that in this proof the low basis theorem
is used, which is in close relation to Weak König’s lemma.
44 Simpson (1999, p. 92).
45 Simpson (1999, p. 139).
46 See Hájek (1993, p. 189f).
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lemma only the existence of an infinite path can be proved without giving a way to pick
out this infinite path, we can construct the infinite path in ACA0 in the sense that we can
pick out one unique path, for example the leftmost.47 In most of the textbook presentations
the Lindenbaum lemma is proved in such a constructive way that will provide a maximally
consistent set. In such a case the formalisation in ACA0 seems more faithful. It is known
that PA does not interpret ACA0. In this sense, even in the usual completeness proof
concepts are used that exceed those of PA. But note that all these theories are arithmetically
conservative over PA.
ACA0 is a natural fragment of second-order arithmetic (a natural ‘stopping point’). It
plays an important role in reverse mathematics. It is well known that there are many
theorems that are provably (in a weak theory) equivalent to ACA0 and some of them
are also relevant for semantic notions such as truth. Examples are versions of Ramsey’s
theorem and the Ehrenfeucht–Mostowski lemma.48 It is an advantage of a theory of truth
to be able to recover all these theorems. Theories of truth that are interpretable in the base
theory PA cannot capture these theorems, as the following argument shows.
Assume that T is a theory of truth interpretable in PA and A is a theorem that is
equivalent to ACA0 i.e. RCA0  A ↔ ACA0. Assume further that there is a suitable
interpretation I of the theorem A in T . This means that that there is a structure preserving
translation from L2A in LT , such that T  I (A ∧ RCA0) and for all B, if RCA0, A 
B, then T  I (B). But the equivalence implies that RCA0, A  ACA0 and therefore
T  I (ACA0), which would mean that T interprets ACA0. But as T is interpretable in
PA and interpretability is transitive ACA0 would also be interpretable in PA, which is not
the case.
The proof of the completeness theorem in PT− exemplifies the role a truth predicate is
able to play. PT− is not a theory capable of formalizing all model theoretic results and it is
not argued for a replacement of standard model theory formalized set theoretically. Rather
the purpose of the outlined proof is to show that basic results of model theory, which rely
on the notion of truth, can be carried out in a minimal theory of truth. This is again evidence
that the concept of truth of PT− has genuine expressive power that is not captured by PA
or by theories of truth that are interpretable in PA, such as CT.
§7. Expressiveness exemplified by speed-up. The expressive function of the truth
predicate is also explicable from a pragmatic point of view. We can think of the function
as being merely instrumental: whereas the truth predicate does not allow to prove new
arithmetical theorems it allows us to simplify proofs of arithmetical theorems already
derivable in PA. The expressive strength of the truth predicate lies in its ability to shorten
proofs.
This pragmatic understanding of expressiveness connects deflationary conceptions of
truth with tennets of instrumentalism especially with Hilbert’s program. Conservativity
plays also in Hilbert’s program a justificatory role for the ideal part of mathematics. The
instrumental function of the ideal part is sometimes connected with its role in simplifying
proof procedures of theorems of the real part.49 Something analogous is the case with
minimal theories of truth. The truth predicate is able to simplify proofs of the base theory
47 In order to avoid confusion we have to say that this use of construct is not exactly the one of
constructivist mathematics, but rather a more naive use of construct.
48 Simpson (1999, p. 122).
49 Compare Caldon & Ignjatovic̀ (2005).
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without committing itself to new theorems in the base language. This instrumental function
of the truth predicate is part of its expressive function.
In our case the instrumental function of simplifying proofs of the truth predicate can
be established as the following claim: the theory PT− has non-elementary speed-up over
PA, i.e., there is an arithmetical formula ϕ(x), such that PA  ϕ(n) for all n ∈ ω, but
the length of proofs for ϕ(n) in PA for these statements are not bounded by any function
f polynomial in n, but only superexponential in n. On the other hand we find relatively
short proofs for those statements in PT−. This is exactly one of the advantages a purely
expressive device could have: we cannot prove new theorems in the old language, but for
the theorems we can prove we find shorter and more natural proofs. There are well known
unpublished speed-up results by Solovay for ACA0 over PA as well as for BG over ZF and
the following speed-up proof relies on the method developed by Solovay and explained in
Pudlák (1998).
THEOREM 7.1. PT− has non-elementary speed-up over PA.
In the following we will sketch the main ideas of the proof.50 The formula we want to show
speed-up for is a restricted consistency statement Con pa(x) saying that there is no proof of
length less or equal to x of 0 = 1. Friedman and Pudlák showed that a proof of Conpa(n)
in PA contains at least n symbols. So if we plug in the super-exponential function, then a
proof of Con pa(2n) in PA contains at least 2n symbols.
On the other hand we can give polynomial bounds in n on the proofs in PT− of
Conpa(2n). This is due to the fact that we can define a cut C(x) in PT− with certain
properties. A cut is basically an initial segment of a model of arithmetic that satisfies
certain closure conditions, such as that if a number (standard or non-standard) is in the
cut, then so is its successor and if a number is in the cut then all numbers smaller are also
in the cut. By using the method of shortening cuts that was developed by Solovay, for such
a cut C(x) we can prove C(2n) in PT− by a proof of size polynomial in n. The crucial step
is then the following lemma:
LEMMA 7.2. There is a definable cut C(x) in PT− such that PT− proves the consistency
of PA on this cut, i.e.
∀x(C(x) → Con pa(x)).
Proof. (Sketch) The basic idea is to define a cut such that all formulas in this cut are
total. We can use this cut in order to prove a restricted reflection principle for this cut. That
is, we can prove that all axioms of PA are true on this cut and that the rules of inference
preserve truth on this cut. This is sufficient to define a new cut, such that all PA-provable
sentences on this cut are true. So we can prove that PA is consistent on this cut. 
In contrast to the speed-up of PT− over PA, the disquotational theories like TB and UTB
have no meaningful speed-up. For those theories we have a simple way to locally interpret
them in PA and keeping the arithmetical vocabulary fixed, namely by replacing, in every
proof, the axiomatic truth predicate by the partial truth predicate that is definable in PA and
satisfies all the Tarski-biconditionals that are used in the proof. To transform it into a proof
in PA we have to add the proofs for the Tarski-biconditionals of the defined predicates. But
these proofs can be bound by a polynomial, and therefore this also holds for the length
of whole proof.
50 The details of this proof are worked out in Fischer (2014).
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Let us now compare PT− in terms of speed-up with classical compositional truth. Gen-
erally the question whether CT has non-elementary speed-up over PA is open as far as
is known to the authors. But there are some partial results: If we add the statement that
all axioms are true, then we can prove the consistency on a cut and thereby obtain speed-
up.51 If we do not, then we can see that the interpretability of CT in PA excludes 1
sentences to be witnesses for the speed-up.52 So if there is speed-up, then we would need
a conceptually different proof.
§8. Reflection principles. The restriction to conservative extensions of PA has well-
known limitations for a theory of truth. We want to address one of the main concerns one
might have.53 The truth predicate is a natural candidate for expressing the soundness of the
base theory that we accept. The problem is that by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem
a conservative extension of PA is not able to prove a standard consistency statement for PA.
This also implies that a conservative theory of truth containing UTB cannot prove a sound-
ness statement in form of the global reflection principle ∀x(Snt (x) ∧ Prpa(x) → T (x)).
This way of expressing the soundness of arithmetic excludes models. In particular,
it excludes those non-standard models that contain ‘proofs’ (of non-standard length) of
0 = 1. From an algebraic perspective, this is not acceptable: each model of PA is as good
as any other.
Viewed in this light, it is not at all clear that the global reflection principle is ‘the’ correct
way to state soundness or the only one. PT− cannot prove the global reflection principle in
its general form. But if we restrict the formulas in a specific way as is done in Lemma 7.2,
then PT− is able to prove a restricted version of global reflection:
∀x(Snt (x) ∧ ∃y(Proof pa(y, x) ∧ C(x) ∧ C(lh(y))) → T (x)).
This restricted version of global reflection is also adequate to state soundness. For one
thing we know that all standard numbers are in the cut and therefore the proof predicate on
a cut is extensionally correct in the sense that it strongly represents the relation of being
a proof in PA. So we can prove that there is no proof in PA of an inconsistency that has
standard length. In sum, even if one thinks that a reasonable theory of truth is committed
to prove a reflection principle for the base theory to be able to express a soundness claim,
one can still argue (even though it is a conservative extension of PA) that PT− is adequate
in this respect.54
§9. Conclusion. There are two perspectives from which a mathematical theory such
as arithmetic or set theory can be viewed. On the one hand, one can take these theories to
be about one privileged model or about a small class of privileged models. On the other
51 This unpublished result was reported by Albert Visser.
52 This observation is also due to Albert Visser.
53 These concerns were raised a.o. by Ketland (1999) and Shapiro (1998).
54 Whether provability on a cut is an intensionally correct representation of provability simpliciter
is debatable. Sometimes the Löb conditions are taken to be criteria of adequacy, also because
provability predicates satisfying them are subject to Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.
Provability on a cut satisfies at least Löb 1. Moreover it satisfies weaker versions of Löb 2 and
Löb 3 making it subject to a strengthened version of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. See
Hájek & Pudlák (1993, chap. 3(b)).
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hand, one can take all models of these theories to be on a par. The latter can be called the
model-theoretic or algebraic perspective.
It is the latter viewpoint that we have adopted in this article. We have not defended this
viewpoint here; we have contented ourselves with observing that this is a viewpoint that is
commonly adopted in certain parts of mathematics such as model theory.
Now suppose we want to formulate an adequate truth theory for a mathematical theory.
If the algebraic perspective is adopted, then the truth theory ought to be semantically
conservative. When added to the theory, no models of the original theory ought to be
thereby ruled out, otherwise it is not a truth predicate for that theory. At the same time, it
is generally recognised that the central role of the concept of truth is to fulfil an expressive
role: it ought to allow us to express certain propositions (mostly semantical propositions)
that we could not express before.
The central claim of this article is that there are natural truth theories that satisfy both
the demand of semantical conservativeness and the demand of adequately extending the
expressive power of our language. In particular, the theory PT− fils the bill. It is semanti-
cally conservative over its mathematical base theory. Its expressive power is most clearly
witnessed by its conceptual irreducibility to (or non-interpretability in) the base theory.
The expressive power of the truth predicate also outs itself in a number of concrete
phenomena. The theory PT− allows the finite expression of the content of mathematical
theories that are not finitely axiomatisable. PT− accommodates natural proofs of semantic
theorems (the completeness theorem), and it has non-elementary speed-up with respect to
its arithmetical base theory. The technical results in this article are not particularly deep:
they follow relatively straightforwardly from results that are well known. Instead, the aim
of this article was to give a philosophical discussion of the minimal requirements that
a truth theory has to satisfy for the purposes of doing metamathematics. To do this, we
needed to bring out explicitly the role that truth plays in metamathematical reasoning.
PT− is not the only truth theory that satisfies these two core requirements, and for some
purposes it is perhaps not even the most attractive such theory. There might, for instance,
be reasons for preferring some type-free extension of it. But PT− does appear to be the
minimal truth theory that satisfies these (from an algebraic perspective) core demands. It
has the properties that one minimally requires from a truth theory when one takes a model-
theoretic perspective, and it has no more than these properties.
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§11. Criterion of Expressiveness. Let IML ⊆ MODL. We say that a class of
L-models κ is EC (an Elementary Class) in L with respect to IML if and only if there
is a formula ϕ ∈ L such that κ = MODL(ϕ) and MODL(ϕ) ⊆ IML. When we compare
language expansions we have to make sure that we also increase the class of intended
structures, i.e. if we have two languages L1 ⊆ L2 we have to assume that IML1 ⊆{ML1 |M ∈ IML2}. This allows us to formulate the following explication:
Explication. Let L1 ⊆ L2 be two first-order languages. Let IML1 ⊆ MODL1 and
IML2 ⊆ MODL2 , such that IML1 ⊆ {ML1 |M ∈ IML2}. We say that L2 with
respect to IML2 is expressively stronger than L1 with respect to IML1 , in symbols
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L1(IML1) < L2(IML2), iff there is an elementary class κ ⊆ IML2 , such that κ ′ ={ML1 |M ∈ κ} is not elementary in L1 with respect to IML1 .
§12. Completeness. For significant parts of this appendix we rely on definitions and
proofs from Simpson (1999). We first show how to recover a fragment of second-order
arithmetic in PT−. We talk about sets by translating second-order arithmetic into the lan-
guage of truth in the following way. σ : L2A → LT :
σ(xi ) := x2i ; σ(X j ) := x2 j+1;
σ(xi ∈ X j ) := T (σ (X j )( ˙σ(xi ))) = T (x2 j+1( ˙x2i ))
To simplify things we will use greek letters α, β, γ as variables for total arithmetical
formulas. So ∀αϕ(α) is an abbreviation for ∀x(tot (x) → ϕ(x)). In this notation, our
induction axiom can be written as:
(ItI) ∀α(T (α(0)) ∧ ∀y(T (α( ẏ)) → T (α(y +. 1)) → ∀yT (α(ẏ))).
This allows us to define the following notions: α ⊆ β, α is finite, k ∈ α × β, f is a (total)
function from α to β and f is an n-ary function f : Nk → N.
A formula ϕ ∈ LT is an open truth formula if and only if all the formula-variables α
occurring in ϕ inside the truth predicate are free and total. Now we can prove some basic
facts, such as open truth comprehension:55
THEOREM 12.1.
∃α∀y(T (α( ẏ)) ↔ ϕ(y))
for all open truth formulas ϕ, such that α not free in ϕ.
We can prove some basic facts about functions in PT−, for example that composition,
primitive recursion and minimisation give new functions. Moreover we can define trees
and paths in a way that we can prove König’s lemma in PT−.56
THEOREM 12.2 (König’s lemma). Every infinite finitely branching tree T has at least one
infinite path.
These are the basics which we need in the following. For the completeness theorem
we want to consider various languages and theories formulated in those languages. The
signature of a language L is a set of relation symbols, function symbols and constant
symbols. The set of terms and the set of formulas of L are defined inductively as usual.
For a language L we assume a fixed signature and symbol numbering. In PT− we can
prove the existence of a Gödel numbering for all expressions of L by primitive recursion.
We can then identify expressions with their Gödel numbers as usual and prove in PT−
the existence of formulas T ermL, FormL strongly representing the relations of being an
L-term and L-formula by open truth comprehension taking L as a parameter. We also get
provability predicates for arithmetically definable sets of formulas.
Let α be a formula defining a set of L-formulas. Then we can express ‘x is a proof of y
from α’ and ‘y is derivable from α’:
55 For a proof see Fischer (2009).
56 The proof is similar to the proof in ACA0, as given in Simpson (1999, p. 121)
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ProofL(α, x, y) :↔ Seq(x) ∧ ∀k < lh(x)(FmlL((x)k) ∧ y = (x)lh(x)−1∧
(T (α( ˙(x)k)) ∨ l Ax((x)k) ∨ ∃i, j < k((x)k = (x)i →. (x) j ))
PrL(α, y) :↔∃x(ProofL(α, x, y))
Clearly if ProofL(α, x, y), then ProofL′(α, x, y) for all L ⊆ L′.
DEFINITION 12.3. A formula α defines a truth set for L iff
∀y(T α(y) → SntL(y)) ∧
∀y ¬(T α(y) ∧ T α( ¬. y)) ∧
∀y (T α(y) ↔ T α( ¬. ¬. y)) ∧
∀y, z (T α(y) ∧ T α(z) ↔ T α(y ∧. z)) ∧
∀y, z (T α( ¬. (y ∧. z)) ↔ T α( ¬. y)) ∨ T α( ¬. y))) ∧
∀y (T α( ∀. zy) ↔ ∀zT α(y(ż))) ∧
∀y (T α( ¬. ∀. zy) ↔ ∃zT α( ¬. y(ż)))
A full truth set x is a truth set such that for all literals l either l ∈ x or ¬l ∈ x .
Second part:
Let us now sketch a proof of the completeness in PT−. Consider the first step: Let L be
a first-order language. Take C to be a countably infinite set of constants not in L. LC =
L ∪ C . Let 〈ϕn | n ∈ N} be an enumeration of formulas of LC with one free variable
and 〈cn | n ∈ N} a one-to-one enumeration of C , such that for all n, cn does not occur
in any ϕi with i ≤ n. The Henkin sentences μn are sentences of the following form:
μn = ∃xϕn(x) → ϕ(cn). Let 
 be a set of L-formulas. The set 
∗, 
 extended by all
Henkin sentences, is called the Henkin extension of 
 in LC .
LEMMA 12.4. (PT −)
If 
 is a consistent set of formulas, then its Henkin extension 
∗ is also consistent.
Proof. Let 
 be a consistent set of L-formulas. One can easily prove in PT − that 

is also consistent in LC . By the formalization of the usual syntactical argument it follows
that 
∗ is consistent. 
For the second step we prove a version of Lindenbaum’s lemma in the following way.
LEMMA 12.5. (PT −) For every consistent set 
, there is a full truth set 
∗ ⊇ 
.
Proof. Define a binary branching tree T
 of truth sets in the following way: t ∈ T
 iff
∀n < lh(t)((t)n = 1 → SntL(n)) ∧
∀n < lh(t)(n ∈ 
 → (t)n = 1) ∧
∀n, m < lh(t)(n = ¬. m → ((t)n = 1 → (t)m = 0)) ∧
∀n, m < lh(t)(n = ¬. ¬. m → ((t)n = 1 ↔ (t)m = 1)) ∧
∀k, n, m < lh(t)(k = m ∧. n → ((t)k = 1 ↔ (t)n = 1 ∧ (t)m = 1)) ∧
∀k, n, m < lh(t)(k = m ∨. n → ((t)k = 1 ↔ (t)n = 1 ∨ (t)m = 1)) ∧
∀k, n, m < lh(t)(k = ¬. (n ∨. m) ↔ ((t)k = 1 ↔ (t)n = 0 ∧ (t)m = 0)) ∧
∀k, n, m < lh(t)(k = ¬. (n ∧. m) → ((t)k = 1 ↔ (t)n = 0 ∨ (t)m = 0)) ∧
∀n, m < lh(t)(n = ∀. zm → ((t)n = 1 ↔
∀z(m(ż) < lh(t) → (t)m(ż) = 1))) ∧
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∀n < lh(t)(n = ¬. ∀. zm → ((t)n = 1 ↔
∃z(m(ż) < lh(t) ∧ (t)m(ż) = 0)))
The tree T
 exists by open truth comprehension. Moreover, it is provable in PT − that 

is consistent iff T
 is infinite.
Define T ∗ to be the set of nodes in T that are infinitely expandable, i.e. t ∈ T ∗ iff t ∈ T

and the set of σ ∈ T
 , such that t ⊆ σ , is infinite. T ∗ exists by open truth comprehension.
T ∗ is nonempty as T
 is infinite and therefore contains 〈〉. But in every step in T ∗ there
are at most two immediate successors and at least one. So we can define a function f (t) =
t〈m〉, where m is the least number n, such that t〈n〉 ∈ T ∗. By primitive recursion we
can define a path g through T
 , g : N → N, such that g[n] = 〈g(0), ..., g(n − 1)〉. This
infinite path g defines a full truth set. 
As for the third step:
DEFINITION 12.6. A countable modelM of signature L is an ordered pair (M, I ), where
M ⊆ N and I is a function assigning to each constant symbol c an element of M, each
n-place relation symbol a n-ary relation and to each m-ary function symbol a m-ary
function. A variable assignment is a function σ : V ar → M. A satisfaction relation
forM | ϕ[σ ] has to satisfy the usual Tarski clauses:
M | s = t[σ ] ⇔ sM,σ = tM,σ
LEMMA 12.7. Every full truth set induces a model.
Proof. Take M := {cn | ¬∃m < n(n = m ∈ 
∗)} and cM := the least cn such that
c = cn ∈ 
∗. For a n-ary relation symbol P take
PM := {〈c1, ..., cn〉 | c1, ..., cn ∈ M and P(c1, ..., cn) ∈ 
∗}.
For f a m-ary relation symbol take
fM = {〈c1, ..., cm+1〉 | c1, ..., cm+1 ∈ M and f (c1, ..., cm) = cm+1 ∈ 
∗}.
M exists by open truth comprehension and we can prove that the Tarski clauses hold. 
THEOREM 12.8. (PT −) Every consistent set of sentences is satisfiable.
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